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INTRODUCTION
In 1985, the Community for Creative Non-Violence (CCNV), a non-
profit organization devoted to the eradication of homelessness, ap-
proached a Baltimore artist, James Earl Reid, to create a sculpture
that CCNV would enter into the Washington Christmas Pageant of
Peace.' After two telephone conversations, an agreement was
reached between Reid and CCNV. However, the parties did not dis-
cuss copyright ownership until after the statue was completed.
CCNV claimed that Reid was its employee and, because of this rela-
tionship, the copyright to the statue belonged to the organization.
Reid, on the other hand, argued that he was an independent contrac-
tor and, thus, the copyright belonged to him.2 The ensuing suit qui-
eted a century long dispute concerning the "work made for hire"
doctrine and the ownership of artistic and intellectual endeavors.
The interpretation of the work made for hire theory of ownership 3
under the Copyright Act of 1976 applies not only to artists like James
Earl Reid, but also to writers, film makers, advertisers, computer
programmers, and other persons in similar areas of intellectual en-
deavor. The dispute in Community for Creative Non-Violence v.
Reid 4 and other cases involved the methods for differentiation and
application of the terms "employee" 5 and "independent contractor."6
1. Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730 (1989). See infra
notes 98-134 and accompanying text for a more detailed discussion of the facts.
2. Id. at 736. Leading cases in other circuit courts that have adjudicated the work
made for hire issue are: Dumas v. Gommerman, 865 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1989) (copy-
right infringement of lithographs resolved by deciding the work for hire issue), 738
F.2d 548 (2d Cir. 1984) (copyright infringement of statuettes resolved by deciding the
work for hire issue), cert denied, 469 U.S. 982 (1984); Easter Seal Soc'y for Crippled
Children & Adults of La., Inc. v. Playboy Enters., 815 F.2d 323 (5th Cir. 1987) (copy-
right infringement of a film segment resolved by deciding the work for hire issue); Al-
don Accessories Ltd. v. Spiegel, Inc. See iVfra notes 69-113 and accompanying text.
3. See infra note 58 and accompanying text.
4. 490 U.S. 730. See infra notes 150-179 and accompanying text for an explana-
tion of the ruling.
5. An employee is generally considered to be in the permanent employ and su-
pervision of his employer, the hiring party. See infra note 56.
Clarification of the differences between these terms is essential since
their application is copyright determinative. When the commission-
ing party7 of a work is granted authorship of the copyright, that
party receives a copyright monopoly, thus eliminating the threat of
the creator's statutory power of termination.8 Consequently, the cre-
ator of the work is left with little or no rights reserved in the work
he created.
At common law and under the Copyright Act of 1909 (1909 Act),
the work made for hire debate focused on the legal definitions of the
term "employee" in determining whether a work was made for hire. 9
The principles of common law agency were used to outline the defini-
tion of "employee." The employer was generally afforded ownership
of the work made, as well as the copyrights to the work, merely due
to the existence of the employer-employee relationship: "The courts
. . . viewed the employer-employee relationship as a manifestation of
an employee's express consent to pass his copyrights to his
employer."lO
The Copyright Act of 1976 (1976 Act)" created a dichotomy be-
tween employees and independent contractors.12 Subsequently, two
6. An independent contractor is usually hired for one project and works under
somewhat unsupervised and independent terms. See infra note 56.
7. The commissioning party is the one who hires the independent contractor. He
is not considered an "employer" because no employer-employee relationship exists.
For a discussion of the employee-employer relationship as contrasted with the in-
dependent contractor-commissioning party arrangement, see infra note 58.
8. McNamara, Preserving the Creator's Right of Authorship to Works Made for
Hire, 7 ENT. & SPORTS LAW. 3, 1 & 13 (Publication of the ABA Forum on the En-
tertainment and Sports Industries) [hereinafter McNamara]. The power of termina-
tion is defined in 17 U.S.C. § 203 (1982). Id. at 13. The author may terminate the grant
after the statutory time period succeeding the grant has passed. Id. (referring to 17
U.S.C. § 203 (a)(3)). The power of termination is very important because it secures the
author's rights when the work increases in value after the execution of the grant. Id.
Thereafter, the author can terminate the grant and renegotiate the transfer. "The
work made for hire controversy exists because commissioning parties wish to evade
the impact of the power to terminate by being classified as authors instead of mere
owners [of the work but not the copyright]." Id.
9. The agency definition of "employee" was generally utilized in these early
cases. See infra note 76 for the agency definition of employee under RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220 (1958).
10. Comment, The "Work for Hire" Definition In The Copyright Act of 1976: Con-
flict Over Specially Ordered or Commissioned Works, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 559-61
(1989).
11. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-914 (1989) (successor to Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-
349, 35 Stat. 1075 (1909)).
12. Work for hire is defined in two clauses:
A 'work made for hire' is -
(1) a work prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her em-
ployment; or
(2) a work specially ordered or commissioned for use as a contribution to
a collective work, as a part of a motion picture or other audiovisual work,
as a translation, as a supplementary work, as a compilation, as an instruc-
tional text, as a test, as answer material for a test, or as an atlas, if the
[Vol. 18: 589, 1991] Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
significant and differing interpretations of the 1976 Act surfaced.
One interpretation focused on the literal, strict interpretation of the
1976 Act,13 while the other construed the 1976 Act in broad terms
and maintained much of the analytic theory from the 1909 Act.1 4 In
Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, the United States
Supreme Court quieted the century long controversy and stated that
"work made for hire" will be defined in accordance with the exclu-
Sive interpretation of work made for hire as found in the Copyright
Act of 1976.15 The Court returned a strict reading of 'the statutory
language, elucidating the proper test to determine the status of the
author.
This Note assesses the treatment of the issue by the Supreme
Court and its recent interpretation of the work made for hire dichot-
omy in Community for Creative Non-Violence. Part II traces the his-
torical development of the copyright work made for hire controversy,
beginning with the common law rule upon which the pertinent provi-
sions of the 1909 Act were based. Part II also considers the 1976 Act
and the relevant cases brought under it. Part III outlines the factual
and procedural setting surrounding the decision in Community for
Creative Non-Violence, and Part IV analyzes the Court's opinion and
resolution of the employment relationship between the parties. Part
IV then considers the impact which Community for Creative Non-Vi-
olence will have upon the art community and in areas of intellectual
expression.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. The Purpose and Philosophy of the Copyright Law
"The philosophy and letter of the copyright law reward originality
parties expressly agree in a written instrument signed by them that the
work shall be considered a work made for hire ....
17 U.S.C. § 101 (1989).
The dichotomy arises because the two clauses can be read as either an exclusive
enumeration of what constitutes work made for hire, or as a general guideline for
what types, of situations are to be considered work made for hire.
13. This interpretation held that a work made for hire relationship exists only
within the employment relationship or as defined in the nine enumerated categories in
17 U.S.C. § 101(2). See irnfra note 66 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the
strict interpretation, see generally Comment, supra note 10, at 575-80.
14. This interpretation held that a work for hire relationship exists within the
traditional employment relationship, as well as in other situations similar to, but not
limited to those listed in 17 U.S.C. § 101(2). For a discussion of the more lenient inter-
pretation, see generally Comment, supra note 10, at 573-75.
15. 490 U.S. 730, 747-48 (1989).
and creativity."16 Copyright protects the author of an original ex-
pression against unauthorized copying by another.17 It grants the au-
thor the exclusive right to copy his own work for gain and the right
to grant or deny this privilege to others. The original expression,
however, must exist in a fixed tangible form before it can be afforded
this protection.S Ideas cannot be copyrighted; copyright can be ob-
tained only on tangible expressions of those ideas. Infringement of
copyright occurs when protected tangible expressions are copied or
duplicated.19 Thus, intellectual endeavor is protected under the copy-
right laws, giving incentive to the propagation of expression and crea-
tivity in our society. Hence, authors are free to create without the
fear that others will appropriate or exploit their expressions without
their prior authorization.
Unauthorized copying infringes upon the copyright owner's enu-
merated privileges20 under the law. A cause of action for infringe-
ment can be brought against the unauthorized copier;21 however, suit
may only be brought by the author or copyright holder.22 In work
16. FitzGibbon & Kendall, The Unicorn in the Courtroom." The Concept of "Super-
vising and Directing" an Artistic Creation is a Mythical Beast in the Copyright Law,
15 J. ARTs MGMT. & L. 23, 41 (1985). The United States Constitution empowers Con-
gress to provide authors with a monopoly of exclusive rights to their intellectual work
to "[p]romote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discover-
ies." Id. at 41 n.1 (citing U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8). See also Goldstein v. California,
412 U.S. 546, 555 (1973) (holding that the copyright clause describes Congress' objective
"to promote the progress of science and the arts" and to encourage people to pursue
"intellectual and artistic creation" by granting to those individuals the exclusive right
to their work); Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) (stating that copyright clause
reflects an "economic philosophy" that "encouragement of individual effort by per-
sonal gain is the best way to advance public welfare through the talents of authors and
inventors in 'Science and useful Arts.' ").
17. Renowned commentator Melville Nimmer has stated:
Just as copying is an essential element of infringement, so substantial similar-
ity between the plaintiff's and defendant's works is an essential element of
copying. Yet, the determination of the extent of similarity which will consti-
tute a substantial and hence infringing similarity presents one of the most dif-
ficult questions in copyright law, and one which is the least susceptible of
helpful generalizations.
3 M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 13.03[A] (1990) (footnote omit-
ted) (emphasis in original) [hereinafter 3 M. NIMMER].
18. 1 M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 5.01[A] n.1 (1990) [here-
inafter 1 M. NIMMER].
19. For a discussion of the protections afforded by the copyright law, see FitzGib-
bon & Kendall, supra note 16, at 30-32. "Copyright law protects the original works of
an author [which is fixed in a tangible medium] from copying and nothing else." Id. at
30 (emphasis in original). When copying occurs, the author's copyright is infringed
upon and suit can be brought by the copyright owner of the complaining work.
20. These privileges include the right to reproduce, the right to prepare a deriva-
tive work, the right to distribute copies, the right to perform the copyrighted work
publicly, and the right to display the copyrighted work publicly. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1982).
21. Authorized copying, unlike unauthorized copying, does not constitute copy-
right infringement, 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 17, at 13.05[A].
22. Suit for infringement can only be brought by the "legal or beneficial owner" of
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made for hire situations, the determination of who holds the copy-
right dictates standing to sue for infringement and, consequently,
who receives the privileges of authorship protected by copyright.
Therefore, resolution of the work made for hire issue is important to
the future protection of intellectual expression.
B. The Common Law and Copyright Act of 1909 Interpretation of
Work for Hire
Prior to the passage of the 1909 Act, no explicit statutory provi-
sions applied to the work for hire issue or the determination of copy-
right ownership. The common law theories of agency and traditional
employment dominated the work made for hire analysis. The com-
mon law consent theory "deprived an author of copyrights without
his express consent" 23 by reason of the employment relationship, in
the absence of an express agreement or contract to the contrary.24
The employer was presumed to own the copyrights regardless of
whether the hired artist was an employee or an independent
contractor.2 5
In the 1896 case, Gill v. United States,26 the Supreme Court held
that the employer, Frankford Arsenal, was presumed to own the
copyrights to the drawings of the machines that the employee
the copyright. 17 U.S.C. § 501(b) (1982). For a discussion of infringement and reme-
dies therefore, see generally 17 U.S.C. 501-510 (1982).
23. Comment, supra note 10, at 561. The employer-employee relationship was
viewed "as a manifestation of an employee's 'express consent' to pass his copyrights to
his employer." Id.; see also McNamara, supra note 8, at 2.
24. McNamara, supra note 8, at 2.
25. Id. See also Lin-Brook Builders Hardware v. Gertler, 352 F.2d 298 (9th Cir.
1965) (patron owns copyright to a commercial illustration absent an express agreement
otherwise when held that artist was hired to work on an advertising catalogue);
Lumiere v. Robertson-Cole Distrib. Corp., 280 F. 550 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 259 U.S.
583 (1922) (when professional photographer hired to take pictures, patron owns copy-
right absent an express agreement otherwise).
26. 160 U.S. 426 (1896). Plaintiff was a machinist, foreman, and draftsman at the
Frankford Arsenal in Pennsylvania. Between the years 1869 and 1882, six patents
were granted to Gill for machines he created. In each case, the government reserved
the use of the machines since they were created by someone in their employ. The
court held that
while the claimant used neither the property of the [employer] government,
nor the services of its employees in conceiving, developing, or perfecting the
inventions themselves, the cost of preparing the patterns and working draw-
ings of the machines, as well as the cost of constructing the machines them-
selves that were made in putting the inventions into practical use was borne
by the government, the work being also done under the immediate supervi-
sion of the claimant.
Id. at 433.
designed simply because of the employment relationship.2 7 Owner-
ship to anything invented or created during the existence of an em-
ployment relationship was considered to belong to the employer,
because by hiring the employees, the employer was the originator of
the work, and was, therefore, considered the source of creativity.28
Gill was followed by Dielman v. White 29 in 1900 and Bleistein v.
Donaldson Lithographing Co.30 in 1903. Both cases similarly held
that absent an express agreement otherwise, the patron of the com-
mission, or employer, was the presumed owner of the copyright.3 '
This theory was incorporated into the 1909 Act.3 2 Congress defined
the author as the employer in a work made for hire arrangement, but
failed to define what constituted a work for hire arrangement.; In de-
termining when a work was made within the scope of traditional em-
ployment, the relevant factors the courts examined included:
the existence of an employment contract, at whose, instance, expense, time,
and facility the work was created, and the nature and amount of compensa-
tion, if any, received by the employee for his work .... [and also whether] did
the employer have a right to direct and supervise the performance of the
work.3 3
The courts looked to these and other similar elements of traditional
employment and servitude. Therefore, the courts were forced to de-
fine what constituted a work made for hire, because the 1909 Act did
not specifically address that issue.
The 1909 Act similarly neglected to consider the relationship be-
tween commissioning parties and independent contractors with re-
gard to the work made for hire situation. Independent contractors
are not usually subject to an employer's regular control and supervi-
sion and are commonly hired for relatively short periods of time to
accomplish a specific task. Consequently, the courts addressed the
27. Id. at 436. When an individual invents something during the course and scope
of employment, and the employer is permitted to use the invention, compensation may
not be had by the employee when, the invention was made at the expense of his em-
ployer. Id. at 436.
28. Id. at 435.
29. 102 F. 892 (1900). Dielman is said to have been the source upon which the 1909
Act was based. There, the court stated, "If a patron gives a commission to an artist,
there appears to me a very strong implication that the work of art commissioned is to
belong unreservedly and without limitation to the patron .... [However,] by apt ex-
pressions in the contract .... the artist [can] retain the copyright for himself." Id. at
894-95.
30. 188 U.S. 239 (1903). Three chromolithographic posters were designed by Bleis-
tein's employees and copied without authorization by Defendant. The Court remanded
the case, finding that there was sufficient evidence to be presented to a jury. Id. at 252.
31. Id. at 244-45; 102 F. 522 at 894-95.
32. Copyright Act of March 4, 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075 (1909), repealed by Pub.
L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976).
33. Comment, supra note 10, at 563-64. Courts had to interpret the missing terms
in the Copyright Act. Thus, in the absence of an agreement to the contrary, a rebutta-
ble presumption was created whereby the employer was the statutory author, given
the existence of an employment relationship. Id..at 564.
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commissioner-independent contractor relationship separately from
that of the traditional employer-employee relationship.3 4 Hence, the
courts had to delineate their own standards, paralleling agency law,
to apply to commissioned works, because the 1909 Act provided none
of its own.
In Yardley v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 35 the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals in 1939 held that the hiring party of an artistic work was the
copyright owner unless the terms of the commissioning contract re-
served the artist's rights to the copyright.3 6 The court analyzed the
issue under general contract law without reference to the work made
for hire doctrine of the 1909 Act. Because the circuit court did not
look to the 1909 Act in making its decision, the commissioning party
was not held to be the statutory author.37 Rather, the commissioning
party was held to be the owner of the copyright under an assignment
theory.38
In the 1966 case, Brattleboro Publishing Co. v. Winmill Publishing
Corp.,39 the Second Circuit affirmed the Yardley decision. Using the
work made for hire doctrine, the court found the newspaper, whose
staff designed an advertisement for publication, to be the copyright
34. Id. at 564. The common law has differentiated between the traditional em-
ployer-employee relationship and the commissioning party-independent contractor re-
lationship. Id. at 565 n.33. One report finds,
[Tihe acts of an employee as such are imputed to the person for whom he per-
forms a special commission. Underlying this distinction is the premise that an
employer generally gives more direction and exercises more control over the
work of his employee than does a commissioner with respect to the work of
an independent contractor.
Id. at 565 n.33 (quoting B. VARMER, WORKS MADE FOR HIRE AND ON COMMISSION, SEN-
ATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 86TH CONG., 2ND SESS., COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION,
STuDY 13, at 142 (1958)).
35. 108 F.2d 28 (2d Cir. 1939) (involving a mural painted by an artist commissioned
by the City of New York through a general contractor), cet. denied, 309 U.S. 686
(1940).
36. Id. at 31. The Second Circuit agreed with the federal district court's rationale
that "[w]hen an artist accepts a commission to paint a picture for another for pay, he
sells not only the picture but also the right to reproduce copies thereof unless the
copyright is reserved to the artist by the terms, express or implicit, of the contract
..... Id. at 30.
37. Id. The court interpreted the contract between the parties but did not inter-
pret the statute. Therefore, under the contract assignment theory, the commissioning
party's copyright was not as extensive as that of an employer or statutory author
under the work for hire theory. For instance, the assignee does not possess copyright
renewal rights, as does the statutory author. Id.
.38. Comment, supra note 10, at 565.
39. 369 F.2d 565 (2d Cir. 1966) (plaintiff newspaper staff designed advertisements
for a client which were later published in defendant's weekly circular).
holder.40 The court concluded that it was immaterial whether the
artist was an employee or an independent contractor; the principles
of copyright ownership would apply similarly to both.41 Further-
more, when the intent of the parties was uncertain, there would al-
ways exist a presumption that the copyright belonged to the hiring
party.42 "Thus, because of the courts' refusal to plug the gap left by
Congress' failure to define 'employer,' the same standards applying to
employees' works made for hire were eventually applied to commis-
sioned works made for hire."43
The 1909 Act failed to define a work made for hire and neglected
to address the relationship between the commissioning party and the
independent contractor to the work made for hire doctrine. As a re-
sult, after the promulgation of the 1909 Act, the courts made no dis-
tinction between the employer-employee relationship and the
commissioning party-independent contractor relationship. Instead,
the courts used common law principles to decide the cases before
them.
C The Copyright Act of 1976 and Its Interpretation of
Work for Hire
1. Legislative History of the Revised Work for Hire Doctrine as
Found in the Copyright Act of 1976
The revisions made in the 1976 Act44 were the result of a series of
studies initiated by the Copyright Office in 1955 to revamp the ex-
isting 1909 Act.4 s Congress intended to revise the 1909 Act to benefit
the public welfare and to "give authors their reward due them for
40. Id. at 568.
41. Id. "We see no sound reason why these same principles are not applicable
when the parties bear the relationship of employer and independent contractor." Id.
Therefore, absent any intent or express agreement otherwise, both the independent
contractor and the employee would lose the copyright to his work.
42. Id. To substantiate this finding, the court cited to Lin-Brook Builders Hard-
ware v. Gertler, 352 F.2d 298 (9th Cir. 1965); Yardley v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 108 F.2d
28 (2d Cir. 1939), cert. denied, 309 U.S. 686 (1940); Lumiere v. Robertson-Cole Distrib.
Co., 280 F. 550 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 259 U.S. 583 (1922).
43. Hamilton, Works As Works Made For Hire Under The 1976 Copyright Act:
Misinterpretation And Injustice, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1281, 1286 (1987). Later cases
dwelled on the right to supervise as the definitive test in determining whether the
work was done within the scope of employment. See Murray v. Gelderman, 566 F.2d
1307 (5th Cir. 1978) (whether or not supervision was exercised, the right to supervise
had to exist to make the employment relationship one of work for hire); Scherr v. Uni-
versal Match Corp., 417 F.2d 499 (2d Cir. 1969) (whether the employer enjoys the abil-
ity to direct and supervise work performance is key in discerning whether the work
was made in the course and scope of employment), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 936 (1970).
44. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1989).
45. Comment, supra note 10, at 567. Approximately 40% of copyrighted works in
1965 were works made for hire. Id. Consequently, the rights of artists, publishers, writ-
ers, and movie studios became a very volatile topic with respect to copyright. Id.
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their contributions to society." 46 The Register of Copyrights at that
time stated:
When it was originally drafted in the early 1960's, the bill that eventually
became the Act of 1976 was not based on preexisting legislation, least of all
the Act of 1909. Before embarking on its drafting efforts the Copyright Office
had engaged in an extensive research project.... These studies included con-
siderations of the history and wording of the copyright statutes of other coun-
tries, of international conventions on copyright, and of the long series of
earlier revision bills .... [The 1976 Act's provisions] reflected deliberate
choices between alternatives .... 47
A series of reports in the 1960's were submitted and considered
before the revised Copyright Act appeared in final form in 1976.48
The 1961 Report of the Register of Copyrights4 9 defined work
made for hire as "a work prepared by an employee within the scope
of the duties of his employment, but not including a work made on
special order or commission."5o This definition raised many com-
plaints from the movie and publishing industries because many of
their employment agreements had previously been considered works
made for hire.51 This new construction prohibited commissioned
works from being classified as works made for hire. The publishing
and motion picture industries subsequently claimed that since much
46. Hamilton, supra note 43, at 1290 (quoting REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS, 87TH
CONG., 1ST SESSION, COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION 5, 5 (Comm. Print 1961) [hereinafter
REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS]). Congress wanted to create a "new" copyright law while
affording more rights to the artists as an incentive to create. Id, "While some limita-
tions and conditions on copyright are essential in the public interest, they should not
be so burdensome and strict as to deprive authors of their just reward . .. [The cre-
ators'] rights should be broad enough to give them a fair share of revenue to be derived
from the market for their works." Id. at 1290-91 (quoting REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS at
6).
47. Hamilton, supra note 43, at 1290 (quoting Ringer, First Thoughts on the Copy-
right Act of 1976, 13 Copyright 187, 188 (1977)). Ms. Barbara Ringer was the Register
of Copyrights at that time.
48. Studies for revisions began in the 1950's with draft bills and reports submitted
in 1961, 1963, 1965, and 1967. Id. at 1290-92.
49. A 1961 report of the Register of Copyright suggested a shift in the focus to the
creator of the work. Comment, supra note 10, at 567 (citing to HOUSE COMM. ON THE
JUDICIARY, 87TH CONG., 1ST SESS., COPYRIGHT LAW PROVISION: REPORT OF THE REGIS-
TER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW (Comm.
Print 1961)).
50. Comment, supra note 10, at 567 (quoting HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY,
88TH CONG., 2D SESS., COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION, PART 3: PRELIMINARY DRAFT AND
DISCUSSIONS AND COMMENTS 15 n.11 (Comm. Print 1964)).
51. Comment, supra note 10, at 568. More specifically, the movie studios, Motion
Picture Association of America, Inc., and Magazine Publishers' Association, Inc.
started rivaling against the demands of the Composers and Lyricists Guild of America
Inc., Writer's Guild of America and the Modern Language Association of America.
FitzGibbon & Kendall, supra note 16, at 39-40.
of their work was specially commissioned, such a definition would
create "insupe'rable obstacles" and "major economic dislocation" be-
cause they would lose copyright ownership.5 2
To appease the motion picture and publishing industries, the Copy-
right Office responded with a new definition of work made for hire.
This definition included "a work prepared on special order or com-
mission if the parties expressly agree in writing that it shall be con-
sidered a work made for hire."53 This new definition satisfied the
previous concerns of both the motion picture and publishing indus-
tries.54 However, it brought strong opposition from various authors'
and artists' organizations.55 Authors and artists feared that they
lacked the requisite bargaining power necessary to assure that their
contracts did not contain boilerplate work made for hire clauses.56
A series of compromises and negotiations ensued. Further bills
were submitted in 1965 and in 1967 which enumerated specific cate-
gories of commissioned works to be considered works made for hire
under the statute.57 Thus, "[flor the first time in copyright law, Con-
gress distinguished works produced by traditional employees from
52. Comment, aupra note 10, at 568. Publishers exhibited a particular disturbance
with this definition because this would mean that a publisher would encounter tre-
mendous problems when attempting to publish a collective work, encyclopedia, or
compilation of works. Id Furthermore, publishers would not be able to revise an orig-
inal work. Id "They argued that, because a publisher or movie producer exercises the
true creativity in 'composite works, he should be considered the author for copyright
purposes. If copyright did not vest in the commissioning party, the transaction costs of
dealing with multitudes of authors would render the production of such works eco-
nomically unfeasible. In the end, one basic purpose of the Copyright Clause - to lis-
seminate information and thereby enhance learning - would be frustrated." Id.
(footnotes omitted).
53. Comment, supra note 10, at 568-69 (quoting HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY
89th Cong., 1st Sess., COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION, Part 5:1964 REVISION BILL WITY DIs-
CUSSIONS AND COMMENT 149, 301 (Comm. Print 1964).
54. For a discussion of the concerns of the motion picture and publishing indus-
tries, see supra note 51 and accompanying text.
55. Authors feared that clauses expressly stating that the workwas work made
for hire would become standard in their contracts. Consequently, they would not have
the bargaining power to avoid or contract out of these clauses, this being especially
true for lesser known authors. Artists similarly did not want to fall into the work
made for hire category since many of their works were commissioned. FitzGibbon &
Kendall, supra note 17, at 40.
56. Comment, supra note 10, at 569.
57. The 1965 Bill included four designated categories of works that would be con-
sidered works made for hire when the parties agreed to this status in writing. Hamil-
ton, supra note 43, at 1292. Those categories were collective works, motion pictures,
translations, and supplementary works. Id at 1292 n.61 (referring to REGISTER OF
COPYRIGHTS, 89TH CONG. , 1ST SESS., SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT ON COPYRIGHT LAW RE-
VISION pt. 6, at 67-68 (Comm. Print 1965)). The 1967 Bill made a further compromise
by adding four more categories to the previous four introduced in the 1965 Bill. Id. at
1292. The additional four categories were compilations, instructional texts, tests, and
atlases. Id at 1292 n.63 (referring to H.R. REP. No. 83, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 86, 87
(1967)). All eight categories were incorporated into the final definition of the 1976 Act.
Id. at 1292; 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982). Additionally, § 101(2) of the 1976 Act added answer
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those produced by independent contractors."58 The Senate and
House Reports both commented on the final bill promulgated in 1976:
"'The definition now provided by the bill represents a compromise
which, in effect, spells out those specific categories of commissioned
works that can be considered 'works made for hire' under certain
circumstances.' "59
2. The Copyright Act of 1976 Work for Hire Provision and the
Judicial Interpretation Thereof
Section 101 of the 1976 Act defines work for hire as:
(1) a work prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her employ-
ment; or
(2) a work specially ordered or commissioned for use as a contribution to a
collective work, as a part of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, as a
translation, as a supplementary work, as a compilation, as an instructional
text, as a test, as answer material for a test, or as an atlas, if the parties ex-
pressly agree in a written instrument signed by them that the work shall be
considered a work made for hire .... 60
Subsection one adopts the scope of employment theory of work made
material for tests to increase to nine the enumerated categories of work to be consid-
ered as works made for hire. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982).
58. Comment, supra note 10, at 571. A regular employee is distinguished from an
independent contractor for purposes of federal and state payroll tax withholdings, so-
cial security, and union dues; social security matching by the employer, the employer's
contribution towards unemployment insurance and workers' compensation funds; and
payment by the employer of various benefits including, retirement funds, health insur-
ance, and supplemental unemployment payments. FitzGibbon & Kendall, supra note
17, at 32. Contrastingly, independent contractors are deemed to be self-employed and
do not receive any matching social security contributions from the commissioning
party. Id. at 32.
59. Hamilton, supra note 43, at 1292 (quoting S. Rep. No. 473 94th Cong., 1st Sess.
105 (1976); H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 121, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5659, 5737) (emphasis added). Many consider the negotiating
process that occurred in arriving at the 1976 Act to be an indication that Congress
made deliberate choices in determining the categories it wanted to include under the
work made for hire definition, and that Congress specifically intended for there to be
"a meaningful distinction between employee-created and commissioned works." Id. at
1293. On the other hand, others feel that the negotiation process was a system in
which everyone bartered for inclusions and exclusions, making the final bill a product
of compromise, rather than the intent of Congress. "Because the compromise ... was
negotiated by authors, publishers and other parties with economic interests ... and [as]
thereafter adopted by Congress, it is quite possible that legitimate categories could
have been left out of subsection 2 of the work made for hire definition, and.. . . the
rigidity of the dichotomy approach would foreclose future adjustment." McNamara,
supra note 8, at 16. It has in fact "been unflatteringly described 'as an'immensely com-
plex package of expedients and compromises altogether unilluminating by any concep-
tual thought or principle.'" Hamilton, supra note 43, at 1281 (quoting Whale,
Copyright and Authors Rights, EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV., Feb. 1979, at 38, 38-39).
60. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1989).
for hire under the 1909 Act.61 This is the only part of the 1909 Act
which survived in the 1976 Act's work for hire definition.6 2 Subsec-
tion two marks a significant departure from the 1909 Act's approach
to works made for hire.6 3 Before a commissioned work may be
deemed a work made for hire, three prerequisites must be met under
subsection two.64 First, the work must be specially ordered or com-
missioned.6 5 Secondly, the work must fall within one of the nine cat-
egories specified in this Act: a contribution to a collective work, a
part of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, a translation, a
supplementary work, a compilation, an instructional text, a test, an-
swer material for a test, or an atlas.6 6 Finally, both parties must sign
a written instrument in which they expressly agree that the work is
made for hire.67
Section 201 of the 1976 Copyright Act delineates ownership of the
copyright in a work made for hire relationship. It reads:
(b) WORKS MADE FOR HIRE- In the case of a work made for hire, the em-
ployer or other person for whom the work was prepared is considered the au-
thor for the purposes of this title, and, unless the parties have expressly
agreed otherwise in a written instrument signed by them, owns all of the
rights comprised in the copyright.
68
Therefore, section 101 defines what constitutes a work made for hire
and section 201 defines who is the statutory copyright owner.
Courts have had difficulty applying the statutory definition of
work made for hire under section 101.69 Some courts viewed the 1976
Act as a distinct break from the prior law, whereas others see it as a
continuation of the same work made for hire analysis under the 1909
Act.70 Two interpretations of section 101 have developed to resolve
which commissioned works are categorized as works made for hire:
61. Comment, supra note 10, at 571. However, "[like the 1909 Act, this clause
makes no provision for the treatment of independent contractors." Id.
62. Hamilton, supra note 43, at 1293.
63. Comment, supra note 10, at 571.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. 17 U.S.C. § 201(b)(1989). House Report No. 94-1476 noted the historical impor-
tance of differentiating between commissioned works and works made in the course
and scope of employment. Ld, at Historical and Revision Notes, H.R. REP. No. 94-1476.
In defining works made for hire, the 1976 Act has undergone extensive legislative revi-
sion. "The definition now provided by the bill represents a compromise which, in ef-
fect, spells out those specific categories of commissioned works that can be considered
'works made for hire' under certain circumstances." Id at Historical Revision Note,
H.R. REP. No. 94-1476.69. Comment, supra note 10, at 572. "[T]he work made for hire definition under
§ 101 has been variously interpreted because some courts have chosen to apply case
law developed under the 1909 Act when faced with ambiguity." McNamara, supra note
8, at 13 (footnotes omitted).
70. See McNamara, supra note 8, at 13. See also infra notes 72-126 and accompa-
nying text.
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Congress either intended clause two [of section 101] to be the exclusive test
for commissioned works or it intended clause two to act as a mere safeguard
[not an exclusive list] for those nine specified types of works by requiring both
parties to sign a writing designating the work as one made for hire.
7 1
Therefore, courts have followed either an "exclusive interpretation"
of section 101 or a "non-exclusive interpretation."
Proponents of the exclusive interpretation of section 101 reinforced
the notion that the Copyright Act of 1976 was a break from the 1909
Act,72 and that the legislative purpose behind drafting subsection two
was to delineate nine specific and exclusive categories that would be
considered works made for hire.73 Moreover, an express agreement
had to exist in order for the work to be considered a work made for
hire under clause two.7 4 The supporters of the exclusive interpreta-
tion read the statute literally and restrictively. The two subsections
of section 101 were to become the exclusive test for defining work for
hire.7 5
The leading case promoting the exclusive interpretation is Easter
Seal Society for Crippled Children & Adults of Louisiana v. Playboy
Enterprises,76 which held that a work is made for hire when made in
the scope of employment, as defined under agency principles, or
when the requirements of section 101(a) are met.77 The case in-
volved film footage of a staged Mardi Gras-style parade and Dixie-
land jazz session.7 8 The film was commissioned by Easter Seals and
was made by the WYES television station, which turned the film
over to a Canadian producer who made an adult film with portions of
71. Comment, supra note 10, at 572.
72. See supra note 62, 63 and accompanying text. See also Easter Seal Soc'y for
Crippled Children & Adults of La. v. Playboy Enters., 815 F.2d 323 (5th Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 485 U.S. 981 (1988).
73. See supra note 59 and accompanying text. See also Easter Seal Soc'y, 815 F.2d
323.
74. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
75. Comment, supra note 10, at 575. Section 101 defines which commissioned
works will be considered works made for hire, and limits the scope of controversy so
as to better enable the parties to ascertain copyright ownership. Angel & Tannen-
baum, Works Made For Hire Under S. 22, 22 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 209, 239 (1976).
76. 815 F.2d 323 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 981 (1988).
77. Id. at 334-35, 337. The court stated that a work is made for hire under the 1976
Act
f and only if the seller is an employee within the meaning of agency law, or
the buyer and seller comply with the requirements of § 101(2).... [T]his in-
terpretation is a radical break from 'work for hire' doctrine under the 1909
Act, but there are good reasons for this break .... [Ilt is the best interpreta-
tion of the actual language of the 'work for hire' definition in the 1976 Act."
Id. at 334-35 (emphasis added).
78. Id. at 324.
the taped sequence. 79 The film was subsequently marketed to nu-
merous distributors, including Playboy. 0 WYES claimed that it
filmed the event using its own judgment and creative impulse.81 The
court held in favor of WYES and Playboy, finding that the footage
was not a work made for hire.82
The court noted that there existed a dichotomy between an em-
ployee and an independent contractor which was reflected in the
1976 Act.8 3 Consequently, commentators have suggested that the de-
termination of whether a seller was an employee or independent con-
tractor should first be ascertained by using the rules of agency law.84
79. Id.
80. Id, at 325.
81. Id. at 337.
82. Id. The court adopted a bright line test to determine whether a work was
made for hire: "Only works by actual employees and independent contractors who ful-
fill the requirements of § 101(2) can be 'for hire' under the new statute. Copyright
'employees' are those persons called 'employees' or 'servants' for purposes of agency
law." Id.
83. Id. at 329. Clause one was said to apply to employees and clause two was appli-
cable to independent contractors. Id. "This had the effect of switching from the 1909
Act presumption that the commissioning party owns the final product, to a new pre-
sumption that the independent contractor is the author of the work unless one of the
statutory exceptions named in subsection 2 applies." McNamara, supra note 8, at 13.
84. McNamara, supra note 8, at 14 (referring to Easter Seal Soc'y for Crippled
Children & Adults of La. v. Playboy Enters., 815 F.2d 323, 329, 334-35 (5th Cir. 1987),
cert denied, 485 U.S. 981 (1988). According to agency principles, the definition of a ser-
vant is as follows:
(1) A servant is a person employed to perform services in the affairs of an-
other and who with respect to the physical conduct in the performance of the
services is subject to the other's control or right to control.
(2) In determining whether one acting for another is a servant or an in-
dependent contractor, the following matters of fact, among others, are
considered:
(a) the extent of control which, by the agreement, the master may exercise
over the details of the work;
(b) whether or not the one employed is engaged in a distinct occupation or
business;
(c) the kind of occupation, with reference to whether, in the locality, the
work is usually done under the direction of the employer or by a specialist
without supervision;
(d) the skill required in the particular occupation;
(e) whether the employer or the workman supplies the instrumentalities,
tools, and the place of work for the person doing the work;
(f) the length of time for which the person is employed;
(g) the method of payment, whether by the time or by the job;
(h) whether or not the work is a part of the regular business of the employer;
(i) whether or not the parties believe they are creating the relation of master
and servant; and
(j) whether the principal is or is not in business.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220 (1958).
In Dumas v. Gommerman, 865 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1989), the circuit court held that
the definition of employee in § 101(1) of the 1976 Act is that of a formal, salaried em-
ployee. Id. at 1105. However, the United States Supreme Court rejected this limitation
and held that the statutory definition of employee was that of the conventional em-
ployee. Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 742 n.8 (1989).
See infra note 170 and accompanying text.
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Courts should then apply section 101 of the 1976 Act, subsection one
for employees and subsection two for independent contractors.8 5 In
situations of employment, the employer is the author and statutory
owner of the copyright.8 6 If the artist is found to be an independent
contractor, the artist would be the author and statutory owner of the
copyright.87 Subsection two is to be read literally. Thus, the artist
will be considered an independent contractor under the Act and,
hence, author and copyright owner when the work falls under one of
the nine enumerated categories and where there exists a written
agreement between the parties that the work was made for hire.88
In May v. Morganelli-Heumann & Associates,8 9 the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals decided upon similar theories. In May, suit was
brought for the alleged copyright infringement of architectural
plans.90 Since the cause of action arose before the 1976 Act was in
effect, the court did not use the 1976 Act to arrive at its decision.
Rather, the court hypothesized, in dicta, as to how it would interpret
the 1976 Act had it applied.9x The court considered May an "in-
dependent contractor rather than an employee so under section 101,
May's drawings would not be subject to the 'works for hire' doctrine,
both because of the absence of a written agreement so providing, and
because the drawings do not fall within one of the prescribed catego-
ries of work." 92 The exclusive interpretation of the work made for
hire doctrine in the 1976 Act is implicit in a number of cases: Meltzer
v. Zoller,93 Everts v. Arkham House Publishers, Inc.,9 4 and Childers v.
85. Easter Seal Soc'y, 815 F.2d at 334-35.
86. Id, at 329.
87. 1&
88. Id.
89. 618 F.2d 1363 (9th Cir. 1980).
90. Id. at 1364-65. Fletcher Jones hired May to draw up plans for the Westerly
Stud Project. The contract made no provisions for the copyright. May drafted the pre-
liminary sketches, but was discharged soon thereafter. Subsequently, Fletcher hired
defendant, Morganelli-Heumann & Associates, to finish the job. May claims that the
defendant used and copied his preliminary sketches. Jones claimed no infringement
because he owned the copyright under the doctrine of works made for hire which ex-
isted prior to the enactment of the 1976 Act. Id. at 1365.
91. Id. at 1368 n.4. The alleged infringement occurred in 1969. Id. at 1365. There-
fore, the court applied the 1909 Act. Id. at 1368-69. See supra notes 23-43 and accompa-
nying text for an analysis and application of the 1909 Act.
92. Id. at 1368 n.4. The court refused to give retroactive effect to 17 U.S.C. § 101
and § 201 of the 1976 Act. I&
93. 520 F. Supp. 847 (D.N.J. 1981). This case involved an alleged infringement of
architectural plans. Id. at 849. The court reasoned that "only 'works made for hire' are
those which fall within one of the statutory categories set forth in 17 U.S.C. § 101, and
concerning which the parties enter into an express written agreement designating the
High Society Magazine, Inc.95
In addition to the exclusive interpretation of section 101 of the 1976
Act, the Second Circuit developed a non-exclusive interpretation of
the section. In 1984, the Second Circuit created a new standard by
which to determine whether a work was made for hire in Aldon Ac-
cessories, Ltd. v. Spiegel, Inc.96 This case revived the 1909 Act's pre-
sumption that the commissioning party is the author of the work of
an independent contractor, absent evidence to the contrary.97 With
regard to works made in the course and scope of employment, the
court used the test of control and supervision to determine whether
an employer-employee relationship existed, such that a work could
be considered made for hire.98
In Aldon, the plaintiff designed a line of porcelain statuettes of
mythological creatures to be produced in Japan.99 Through one of its
principals, the plaintiff supervised and worked with the artists in Ja-
pan.10 0 The plaintiff filed a certificate of copyright in 1980.101 One
works as such." Id. at 854. The court found that the architectural plans were not
works made for hire. Id. at 855.
94. 579 F. Supp. 145 (W.D.Wis. 1984). The case involved the alleged infringement
of copyright of a book of poetry. The court stated that "[i]f the 1976 statute was appli-
cable, the admitted lack of a written agreement between the parties and the type of
work involved here (a book of poetry written by a single author) would summarily dis-
pose of Everts' work-for-hire argument and his claim to the copyright." Id. at 148.
95. 557 F. Supp. 978 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). The court stressed the importance of the ex-
press written agreement between the parties which specified the work as work made
for hire, noting that even if a work falls within a specified category, it will not be con-
sidered a work for hire unless the parties agree in writing that the work is such. Id. at
984.
96. 738 F.2d 548 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 469 U.S. 982 (1984).
97. Id. at 551-53. The court found that the legislative history did not indicate a
congressional intent to change the old law under the 1909 Act. Id. at 552. Thus, the
presumption that works made on commission or by special order belonged to the em-
ployer, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, was revitalized. Id. "[T]he Second
Circuit was the first to abandon the new legislation in favor of the pre-1976 Act case
law ...." McNamara, supra note 8, at 13. It has been said that the Aldon decision
"threatens to undermine the legislative compromise represented by the 1976 Act's
work-made-for-hire provisions." Hamilton, supra note 43, at 1295.
98. Aldon, 738 F.2d at 551-53. The control and supervision test delineated in Aldon
depended on the hiring party's actual exercise of this right. Id. See infra notes 98 and
accompanying text for a discussion of the facts of the case. Cf Peregrine v. Lauren
Corp., 601 F. Supp. 828, 829 (D. Colo. 1985) (delineating the test as one consisting of the
right to control and supervise the work regardless of whether that right is actually ex-
ercised). Id. at 829. This interpretation is referred to as the conservative interpreta-
tion of § 101.
99. Id. at 549. Aldon had two principals, Arthur and Irwin Ginsberg. Arthur cre-
ated the mythological statuettes and took part in their production. Id. Irwin con-
tracted with Wado International Corporation to manufacture the porcelain statuettes.
Id.
100. Id. at 549. Irwin testified that he had worked with an artist in developing the
models, and that he and the artist ultimately agreed on the particular pose and propor-
tions for the statuette. The artist's sketches were then delivered to a model maker
who made clay models based on the sketches. Id. at 549-50. Irwin also asserted that
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year prior, the plaintiff had contracted with a Taiwanese company to
manufacture the same statuettes in brasslo2 Once again, one of the
plaintiff's principals traveled to the workshop in Taiwan to supervise
the design and manufacture of the statuettes 0 3 The plaintiff then
filed another certificate of copyright for the brass statuettes.'0 4 In
1981, defendant Spiegel's catalogue advertised for sale brass unicorns
identical to those made for the plaintiff. 0 5
The court held that the statuettes were a work made for hire
under subdivision one of the 1976 Act.lo6 Although the work was
created after the implementation of the 1976 Act, the court analyzed
the facts using the agency and control test developed under the 1909
Act.1o7 The court did not agree that Congress intended to make a
distinct change from the 1909 provisions of work made for hire when
it enacted section 101 of the 1976 Act.l08 The jury instructions
directed:
A work for hire is a work prepared by what the law calls an employee work-
ing within the scope of his employment .... It does not matter whether the
for-hire creator is an employee . .. having a regular job with the hiring au-
thor. What matters is whether the hiring author caused the work to be made
and exercised the right to direct and supervise the creation.1 0 9
The court reasoned that the plaintiff's involvement in the creative
process essentially made him the artistic creator because he super-
vised and directed the artisans.1' 0 Thus, in applying agency princi-
ples to the employment relationship, the statuettes were held to be
"[they] spent hours and hours changing shapes, adjusting attitudes and proportions"
before he found a model to his liking. Id. at 550.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 550.
103. Id. Ginsberg "testified to working with the Unibright employees in essentially
the same manner as he had worked with the Wado artists in developing the porcelain
statuettes.... Several changes were made from the porcelain design at Ginsberg's di-
rection." Id.
104. Id. The filing for the brass statuettes took place in July, 1980, the same time
as the filing for the porcelain statuettes. Id.
105. Id. Spiegel claimed that the plaintiff's copyright was invalid and that it had
ordered the statuettes before learning of plaintiff's claim to the copyright. Id. at 550-
51.
106. Id. at 551-53.
107. Id. at 552. The court reverted to the 1909 analysis because it claimed that Con-
gress did not intend to change the copyright law with respect to work made for hire,
and, therefore, used the basic agency principles it used in deciding cases prior to the
1976 law. Id at 552.
108. Id. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
109. Id. at 551 (emphasis added). On appeal, these jury instructions were held to be
proper. Id. at 553.
110. Id. "There was evidence ... that Ginsberg did much more than communicate a
general concept or idea to the Japanese and Taiwanese artists and artisans ....
works made for hire, and the plaintiff was construed as the essential
creator and owner of the copyright."'
Although Aldon has been widely criticized and unpopular, other
circuits have followed its interpretation of work made for hire under
the Copyright Act.112 The Seventh Circuit, in Evans Newton Inc. v.
Chicago Systems Software,113 used the control and supervision test
revived in Aldon.114 The cause of action in Evans Newton was for
copyright infringement of plaintiff's user's manual to a computer-
managed instruction program.1 5 The court was not concerned with
determining the status of the employment relationship as one of em-
ployee or independent contractor, l x6 but instead with whether the
contractor was "independent or... so controlled and supervised in
the creation of the particular work by the employing party that an
employer-employee relationship exist[ed]."117
Similarly, in Brunswick Beacon, Inc. v. Shock,118 the Fourth Cir-
cuit approached the work made for hire doctrine using pre-1976 ra-
tionale. Absent a written agreement so stating, a creation would not
be considered a work made for hire under subsection two of the
Act.119 Subsection two delineates nine categories of work to be con-
sidered made for hire and requires a written agreement between the
parties. Here, the court found subsection two to be completely inap-
plicable because there was no written agreement.120 Consequently,
[G]insberg actively supervised and directed the creation of both the porcelain and brass
statuettes. He was, in a very real sense, the artistic creator." Id.
111. Id.
112. McNamara, supra note 8, at 14 (noting that in spite of its following, Aldon has
been criticized as a "misinterpretation of the 1976 Act").
113. 793 F.2d 889 (7th Cir. 1986).
114. Id. at 894. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
115. Id. at 890-91. Evans Newton Inc. (END needed a computer programmer to
work on a computer managed instruction program. Id. at 891. ENI was referred to
Chicago Systems Software (CSS) to provide the necessary programming. Id. ENI mar-
keted and published user's manuals for the computer-managed instruction program in
April, 1980. Id at 892. That same month, CSS was found to be marketing a program
and manual similar to that of ENI. Id. at 892.
116. Id. at 894.
117. Id. (quoting Aldon Accessories, Inc. v. Spiegel, 738 F.2d 548, 552 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 982 (1984)). The court found that sufficient control and supervision
existed in the creation of the user's manual to consider it a work made for hire. Id.
118. 810 F.2d 410 (4th Cir. 1987). Both the plaintiff and defendant are publishers of
a newspaper. The defendant paper copied and ran advertisements previously pub-
lished by the plaintiffs. Id. at 411.
119. Id. at 413. Since no agreement existed, the court looked to subsection one of
the Act, and found that the work relationship consisted of a typical employee-em-
ployer relationship, making any products prepared in the scope of employment works
made for hire. Id.
120. Id. Even if the court construed the newspaper as a collective work or compila-
tion under subsection two, there was still no written agreement expressly labeling the
advertisements as works made for hire. Id. The court stated, "This part of the defini-
tion [referring to subsection two] is permissive only and is effective only if both par-
ties execute a written agreement that the work is for hire." Id. at 413 (emphasis
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the court looked to subsection one and held that the work was pro-
duced and prepared in the scope of employment, and thus was a work
made for hire. 121
The non-exclusive interpretation of section 101 of the 1976 Act has
been much criticized, predominantly for its treatment of subsection
two.122 The use of the control and supervision test allows hiring par-
ties to obtain the copyright to a work merely by showing that they
had some supervision or influence over the completed work. 23 This
interpretation leads to abuse because a "commissioned work not des-
ignated a work for hire at the time of contracting may be converted
thereafter by the commissioning party's exercise of 'actual control' in
the production process." 2 4 The purpose behind drafting subsection
two was to eliminate such abuse by delineating the nine categories of
work made for hire.'2 5 This interpretation would make subsection
two superfluous, and would remove the predictability by which the
author of the work could determine his status as employee or in-
dependent contractor.126 In essence, should the non-exclusive inter-
pretation prevail, all of the compromises that went into the drafting
added). Therefore, the Fourth Circuit interpreted subsection two of section 101 as re-
quiring the existence of a written agreement before a work will be deemed to be made
for hire. Id. Because there was no written agreement, the court looked to subsection
one and used general agency principles to determine whether the work was made in
the course and scope of employment. Id. Under this subsection, the court found the
advertisements to be works for hire. Id.
121. Id.
122. See generally McNamara, supra note 8, at 14 (the non-exclusive interpretation
presented by Aldon is a misinterpretation of the 1976 Act); Hamilton, supra note 43, at
1305 (the non-exclusive interpretation threatens to undermine the 1976 Act's work
made for hire definition in that "[s]ubdivision 121 becomes superfluous and many more
works become works made for hire than Congress intended"); Note, The Works Made
For Hire Doctrine Under the Copyright Act of 1976 - A Misinterpretation: Aldon Ac-
cessories Ltd. v. Spiegel, Inc., 20 U.S.F. L. REV. 649, 661 (1986) (Aldon Accessories "im-
properly interpreted the Old Act [1909] case law and the New Act legislative history").
123. Hamilton, supra note 43, at 1304. The non-exclusive interpretation
leaves the door open for hiring parties, who have failed to get a full assign-
ment of copyright rights from independent contractors falling outside the sub-
division (2) guidelines, to unilaterally obtain work-made-for-hire rights years
after the work has been completed as long as they directed or supervised the
work, a standard that is hard not to meet when one is a hiring party.
Id.
124. Comment, supra note 10, at 585.
125. Id. at 586. See supra notes 44-59 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
negotiation and compromise process through which the 1976 Copyright Act was
developed.
126. Hamilton, supra note 43, at 1305. Under this interpretation, an author could
never be certain as to whether he could maintain his copyrights.
of the 1976 Act would be for nought.127
In summary, the courts have been divided as to how to determine
what constitutes work made for hire and how to best interpret sec-
tion 101 of the 1976 Act. In 1989, the United States Supreme Court
decided Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid,128 ruling for
the first time on the issue of work made for hire under the Copyright
Act of 1976.
III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Factual History
Community for Creative Non-Violence (CCNV) is an organization
based in Washington, D.C., which seeks to eradicate homelessness.
In 1985, in furtherance of its cause, CCNV sponsored a statue depict-
ing the plight of the homeless in Washington, D.C.'s Christmas Pag-
eant of Peace.i 29 Mitch Snyder, an agent of CCNV, along with the
members of CCNV, envisioned the appearance of the statue: a mod-
em day nativity scene of a homeless black family "huddled on a
street side steam grate."'3 0 The figures would be life-size, with "sim-
ulated steam" spewing forth from the grate and eddying around their
feet and persons.' 3 ' The scene was entitled "Third World America"
and was presented on a pedestal bearing the words "and still there is
no room at the inn."132
Snyder was referred to James Earl Reid, a Baltimore artist.i3s
Reid was enthusiastic about the project and suggested that the sculp-
ture be made of bronze. He estimated that the cost would be $100,000
and would take approximately six to eight months to finish. 3 4 Sny-
der replied that CCNV had neither the resources nor the time to af-
ford such an endeavor.i3 5 Reid then proposed that the statue be
made of "Design Cast 62," a synthetic substance that would cost con-
127. Id (such an interpretation "erases twenty years of carefully crafted
compromises").
128. 490 U.S. 730 (1989).
129. Id. at 733 (citing to the district court's description of the display, Community
for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 652 F. Supp. 1453, 1454 (D.C. 1987)).
130. I, (citing Community for Creative Non-Violence, 652 F. Supp. at 1454). The
idea was for "a sculpture of a modern Nativity scene in which, in lieu of the traditional
Holy Family, the two adult figures and the infant would appear as contemporary
homeless people huddled on a streetside steam grate. The family was to be black
(most of the homeless in Washington being black) ...... I, (citing Community for
Creative Non-Violence, 652 F. Supp. at 1454).
131. Id, (citing Community for Creative Non-Violence, 652 F. Supp. at 1454).
132. Id. (citing Community for Creative Non-Violence, 652 F. Supp. at 1454).
133. Id. Snyder was referred to Reid through a "mutual artist-acquaintance" from
Massachusetts. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 652 F.Supp. at 1454.
134. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 490 U.S. at 733.
135. Id.
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siderably less money and take less time to produce.13 6 During two
telephone calls made in October, 1985, the contract was finalized.137
No mention was made of a copyright.138
Reid drafted preliminary sketches modeled after a traditional na-
tivity scene which were rejected by Snyder.139 Snyder stated that the
figures should be in a reclining pose,140 have shopping carts141 and
special effect steam rising up out of the grating.142 Reid adjusted his
conception sketches appropriately.14 3
Reid worked through November and the first half of December,
1985. He set his own hours, worked at his own pace, and was assisted
by various people whom he selected.144 A clay model was ready for
casting on December 12, 1985.145 The finished statue was delivered
136. Id. Design Cast 62 would cost approximately $12,000 and no more than $15,000
and could be completed by the December 12th deadline. Community for Creative
Non-Violence, 652 F. Supp. at 1454. Reid informed Snyder that "Design Cast 62 was
sufficiently durable to withstand the elements-'as strong as concrete,' . and could be
tinted to resemble bronze." Id.
137. "Reid testified that he imposed two other conditions which Snyder expressly
accepted: that he would 'reserve his full copyright rights' in the work, and retain 'total
[artistic] control.'" This testimony was not corroborated, and the court did not accept
it as true, stating, "[Tihe conditions themselves are inconsistent with the tenor of the
enterprise .... [S]nyder and CCNV had specific ideas about the sculpture's ultimate
appearance which they would have been unwilling to surrender to someone else's 'con-
trol,' even the artist's." Id, at 1454 n.3.
138. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 490 U.S. at 734. But see infra note 130
and accompanying text.
139. 1& Reid testified that Snyder requested a proposed sketch for 'fundraising'
purposes." Community for Creative Non-Violence, 652 F.Supp. at 1455 n.4. Addition-
ally, although refuted by Reid, Snyder claims that the sketches were subject to his "ap-
proval." Id.
140. 490 U.S. at 734.
141. Id,
142. Id.
143. Id. Reid had originally modelled the family in a traditional creche-like pose,
"the mother seated ... cradling the infant in her lap, and the father standing behind
her, bending over her right shoulder to touch the infant's foot with his right hand."
Community for Creative Non-Violence, 652 F. Supp. at 1455. However, after Reid was
taken on a tour of the homeless neighborhood and observed the people in the steam
grates, he altered his design to include only "recumbent figures." Furthermore, testi-
mony showed that "Reid at first favored 'suitcases' or 'shopping bags,' but was per-
suaded by Snyder and CCNV members to use a shopping cart as an accessory more
typical of the homeless." Id, at 1455 n.5.
144. 490 U.S. at 734. Reid was aided by different people at different times. All of
his assistants were paid by him from funds he received from CCNV. Id. These assist-
ants may be considered joint authors. See infra notes 146-47 and accompanying text.
145. 652 F. Supp. at 1455. The statue had to be submitted by December 12, 1985 in
order to be included in the pageant; however, "the statue was rejected by Pageant offi-
cials, who declined for policy reasons to accept any display with what might be re-
garded as a political message .... Id. at 1455 n.6.
on December 24, 1985, and Reid received his last payment thereaf-
ter.146 Beneath the title on the statue, Reid included the letter "C"
encircled (the copyright sign), along with his name, and the date, in-
dicating his claim to the copyright for the work.147
The statue was displayed for a month, after which it was returned
to Reid for the repair of some minor damage in late January, 1986.148
Several months later, Snyder called to obtain the return of the
statue, but Reid refused.149 On March 20, 1986, Reid filed a Certifi-
cate of Copyright Registration on his behalf.150 Subsequently, Sny-
der also filed a Certificate of Copyright Registration on May 21,
1986,151 and when Reid persisted in refusing to return the statue, a
lawsuit was filed.152
B. Procedural History
CCNV prayed for relief under the 1976 Act and sought a determi-
nation and enforcement of its copyright against the sculptor of the
statue, James Earl Reid.153 Furthermore, CCNV demanded that it be
declared the copyright owner of the statue and that an injunction be
issued prohibiting Reid from infringement. 154 On February 9, 1987,
the injunction was issued, and the district court held that under the
work made for order doctrine of the 1976 Act, CCNV was the owner
of the copyright to the statue "Third World America."155
The district court arrived at this determination by using the right
to direct and supervise test delineated in Aldon.156 Because Snyder
146. 490 U.S. at 735.
147. 652 F. Supp. at 1455 n.7. This copyright claim was determined by the district
court to have been first made on December 24, 1985. Id.
148. 490 U.S. at 735. According to the appellate court, "damage to the foot of the
male figure [had] occurred in the original transportation from Baltimore to D.C. Com-
munity for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 846 F.2d 1485, 1488 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
149. 490 U.S. at 735. Originally, Reid did not want to return the statue because
CCNV wanted to take the statue on tour, and Reid believed that Design Cast 62 was
not sturdy enough to withstand the wear of travel. Id Reid preferred to cast the
statue in bronze, or at least make a mold of it. Id CCNV was not interested in ex-
pending any more funds but suggested that Reid could do so if he desired. Community
for Creative Non-Violence, 652 F. Supp. at 1456. Later, a second demand for the
statue's return was made and was refused by Reid. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id
152. Id. at 1456 n.2.
153. kd at 1454. Ronald Purtee, Reid's photographer, was also named as a defend-
ant. Id at 1454. However, Purtee did not appear at trial and has not made any claim
to the statue. Id at 1454 n.1.
154. Id at 1454. The plaintiff withdrew her claim for statutory damages and attor-
neys' fees at the time of trial. Id at 1454 n.2.
155. 490 U.S. at 735.
156. 652 F. Supp. at 1456. For a discussion of Aldon's non-exclusive interpretation
of § 101 of the 1976 Act, see supra notes 94-109 and accompanying text. Here, the dis-
trict court determined that a work made for hire is any product created by an em-
ployee in the course and scope of employment where "the putative 'employer' was
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and CCNV had decided how they wanted the image produced, 5 7 the
court found that "CCNV nevertheless directed enough of [Reid's] ef-
fort to assure that, in the end, he had produced what they, not he,
wanted, notwithstanding his creative instincts may have been in har-
mony with theirs."58 Consequently, since CCNV and Snyder di-
rected Reid's production, and because there was no express
agreement otherwise, the work was held to be a work made for hire
and CCNV was held the copyright owner. 159 Reid appealed to the
D.C. Circuit of the United States Court of Appeals. 60
The court of appeals noted that the interpretation of "work made
for hire" under the 1976 Act had split the courts.16' Following a long
discussion of the history of work made for hire and an analysis of
other circuit court interpretations, 6 2 the court of appeals adopted the
Fifth Circuit's exclusive interpretation as delineated in Easter Seal.163
Reid was held to be an employee within agency rules of law, and was,
therefore, held to be an independent contractor. 6 4 Additionally, the
either the 'motivating factor' in the production of the work, or possessed the right to
'direct and supervise' the manner in which the work was done .. " Id The copyright
belongs to the employer regardless of "[t]he degree of creative license actually exer-
cised by the artist-employee." Id.
157. Id, "Snyder and his colleagues not only conceived the idea of a contemporary
Nativity scene to contrast with the national celebration of the season, they did so in
starkly specific detail. They then engaged Reid to utilize his representational skills,
rather than his original artistic vision, to execute it." Id.
158. Id.
159. Id, at 1457. The distiict court reasoned that "Reid could have bargained with
CCNV for the copyright but did not do so .... [I]n the absence of a writing to the
contrary, the law leaves no doubt that 'Third World America' is a work made for hire,
and CCNV the exclusive owner of the copyright therein." Id.
160. 846 F.2d at 1488.
161. Id. The appellate court stated that "[t]his issue is novel in this court and has
divided sister courts." Id.
162. The court thoroughly discussed the non-exclusive interpretation of the work
made for hire as set forth by the Second Circuit in Aldon Accessories v. Spiegel, 738
F.2d 548 (2d Cir. 1984) (the commissioning party will be considered the copyright
owner where he retains the requisite supervision and control over the independent
contractor in producing the work), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 982 (1984), and by the Seventh
Circuit in Evans Newton, Inc. v. Chicago Systems Software, 793 F.2d 889 (7th Cir.)
(court looked to see whether the commissioning party had the right to direct and con-
trol the creation of the work such that an employment relationship was said to exist,
thereby vesting the copyright in the employer), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 949 (1986).
163. Id. at 1494. The court adopted the approach set forth in Easter Seal Soc'y for
Crippled Children & Adults of La., Inc. v. Playboy Enters., 815 F.2d 323 (5th Cir. 1987),
cert. denied, 485 U.S. 981 (1988), believing it to be "the most consistent with the lan-
guage, history, and policies of the 1976 Act." Community for Creative Non-Violence,
846 F.2d at 1494. For a discussion of Easter Seal Soc'y, see supra notes 76-86 and ac-
companying text.
164. Id.
sculpture did not fit into one of the nine enumerated categories listed
in section 101(2) of the 1976 Act, and there was no written agreement
between CCNV and Reid.165 The court decided that because the
statue was not a work made for hire, Reid was the copyright
owner.166
Although the Court of Appeals resolved the work made for hire is-
sue, it remanded the case to determine whether CCNV, or any of
Reid's assistants in the project, could be considered joint authors.167
As a joint author, CCNV could have the opportunity of acquiring at
least partial ownership of the copyright.168
CCNV filed for a writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme
Court, which was granted.169 The case was limited to the sole issue
of whether the sculpture, "Third World America," was a work made
for hire under section 101 of the 1976 Act.170
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE COURT OPINION
In Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, the Supreme
Court unanimously affirmed the court of appeals' decision on June 5,
1989,171 thereby ending a century long dispute over the work made
for hire doctrine. In resolving the split of authority in the circuit
courts, the Court validated the exclusive interpretation, by ruling
that a strict interpretation of the existing language of section 101 of
the 1976 Copyright Act was necessary.172
165. Id.
166. Id. at 1497-98, 1499.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 1495. The appellate court noted that "[t]he 1976 Act defines a joint work
as one 'prepared by two or more authors with the intention that their contributions be
merged into inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole.'" Id at 1496 (cit-
ing 17 U.S.C. § 101 1989). Therefore, because Snyder and CCNV had originally con-
ceived the statue, employed a cabinet maker to build the steam grate and base, and
purchased and installed "special effects equipment" to simulate the steam rising from
the grate, in addition to monitoring Reid's work, they may be eligible to be joint au-
thors. Id, at 1495-96, 1497. The court also found that other participants in the creation
of 'Third World America' should be scrutinized as potential joint authors, including:
"(1) employees of Reid or CCNV within the applicable rules, of agency law... subject
to the work for hire doctrine, or (2) artisans carrying out specific orders, i.e., workers
who did not meet the 'more than de minimis' standard of originality and creativity...
needed to qualify for authorship." I&. at 1498 (citation omitted). However, the court
was not prepared to rule on this issue and remanded the joint authorship determina-
tion to the district court. Id at 1498.
169. Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730 (1989).
170. Id. at 732. The rationale preferred by the Supreme Court for granting certio-
rari was "[t]o resolve a conflict among the Courts of Appeals over the proper construc-
tion of the "work made for hire" provisions of the [1976] Act." I& at 736 (footnote
omitted). The Court did not consider the issue of joint authorship, since neither party
sought a review of the appellate court's order. Id. at 753 n.32. Thus, the issue of joint
ownership was remanded back to the district court.
171. Id. at 753. Justice Marshall wrote the opinion for the Court.
172. Id. at 750-51. See infra notes 189-96 and accompanying text.
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The Court recognized the general rule, as enunciated in the 1976
Copyright Act, that whoever creates the work is the author and copy-
right owner. 173 However, the Court also recognized an exception to
the general rule as embodied in the doctrine of work made for
hire.X74 Accordingly, the Court emphasized the importance of classi-
fying a work as the product of either an employee or an independent
contractor.1 75 This classification was considered to be of utmost im-
portance because resolution of the creator's status "determines not
only the initial ownership of its copyright, but also the copyright's
duration .... 176 the owners' renewal rights .... 177 termination rights,
.. 178 and right to import certain goods bearing the copyright .... 179
In its analysis of the issue, the Court looked to the existing lan-
guage of section 101 of the 1976 Act. The sculpture in question did
not fit into any of the nine categories listed under section 101(2) as
works made for hire. 8 0 Additionally, there was no written agree-
ment evidencing that the work was to be considered as a work made
for hire.181 Justice Marshall consequently stated that the "dispositive
inquiry" is whether, under section 101(1) of the Act, "Third World
America" was "prepared by an employee within the scope of his or
her employment."182 The opinion discussed various interpretations
173. By recognizing work for hire as an exception, the Court relied upon the mu-
tual exclusiveness of § 101(1) and § 101(2).
174. Id
175. Id
176. Section 302 of the Copyright Act addresses the duration of a copyright. 17
U.S.C. § 302 (1982). In general, the copyright term is for the life of the author plus 50
years. Id. at § 302(a). Contrastingly, in work made for hire situations, "the copyright
endures for a term of seventy-five years from the year of its first publication, or a term
of one hundred years from the year of its creation, whichever expires first." Id at
§ 302(c).
177. Section 304(a) of the Copyright Act determines the duration of subsisting
copyrights. Generally, the duration of a copyright already in existence as of January 1,
1978 is twenty-eight years from the date it was originally secured. Id. at § 304(a).
178. Section 203 addresses the termination of transfers and licenses granted by the
author. It states that for all works, other than works made for hire, the grant of a
copyright transfer or license is subject to termination in certain circumstances. 17
U.S.C. § 203(a) (1982).
179. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 490 U.S. at 737 (omitting reference to
applicable sections of the Copyright Act of 1976). Section 601(b)(1) provides various
requirements for the manufacture, importation and distribution of copies. In the case
of works made for hire, this section applies when a substantial portion of the work was
made for a person other than a domiciliary or citizen of the United States. 1 M. NIM.
MER, supra note 18, § 5.03[A], at 5-10, 5-11 (referring to 17 U.S.C. § 601(b)(1) (1982)).
180. Id. at 738.
181. Id.
182. Id.
of section 101183 and decided that the exclusive interpretation ap-
proach derived'the most support from the 1976 Act's legislative his-
tory, and most closely defined the intent of Congress.18 4
Although section 101(1) discusses the terms "employee" and "scope
of employment," the 1976 Act nowhere defined the precise meaning
of these terms.18 5 Following the rules of statutory interpretation, the
Court resolved to look to common law agency doctrines to supply the
meaning. The Court believed that when Congress uses terms that
have established meanings under the common law, courts must infer
that Congress intends to implement the common law meanings in
drafting statutes.186 The Court also concluded that Congress in-
tended to apply agency law since the term "scope of employment"
used in section 101(1) is "a widely used term of art in agency law."187
As a final point, Justice Marshall stressed the importance of uniform-
ity and predictability of decisions that would be afforded by the use
of general common law theories of agency law.188
The Court next analyzed the legislative history of the 1976 Act 8 9
and the language of the act itself. The Court noted that the negotia-
tion and compromise which led to the 1976 Act as presently written
183. Id. at 738-39. The four interpretations discussed included: (1) the conservative
interpretation as defined by Peregrine v. Lauren Corp., 601 F. Supp. 828, 829 (Colo.
1985) (a work is made for hire whenever the employer has the right to control and su-
pervise the work); see supra note 96; (2) the nonexclusive interpretation as formulated
by Aldon Accessories, Ltd. v. Spiegel, Inc., 738 F.2d 548, 551-53 (2d Cir.) (a work is
made for hire whenever the employer actually wields control over the product), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 982 (1984), see supra notes 94-109 and accompanying text; (3) the ex-
clusive interpretation announced in Easter Seal Soc'y for Crippled Children & Adults
of La., Inc. v. Playboy Enters., 815 F.2d 323, 334-35, 337 (5th Cir. 1987) (a work is made
for hire if either made in the scope of employment as defined under agency principles
or where the requirements of § 101(2) are met), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 981 (1988); see
supra notes 76-83 and accompanying text; and (4) the formal employee interpretation
set forth in Dumas v. Gommerman, 865 F.2d 1093, 1105 (9th Cir. 1989) (works produced
by formal, salaried employees are works made for hire under § 101(1) of the 1976 Act);
see supra note 76.
184. Communityfor Creative Non-Violence, 490 U.S. at 742-48.
185. Id. at 738. The Court decided that the most important place to start its inter-
pretation of § 101 of the Copyright Act was with its language. Id. at 739.
186. Id. (quoting NLRB v. Amax Coal Co., 453 U.S. 322, 329 (1981)).
187. Id. at 740. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) AGENCY § 228 (1958) for a discussion of
the "scope of employment." See also supra note 84 for a discussion of employment fac-
tors under agency law.
188. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 490 U.S. at 740. With regard to uni-
formity, Justice Marshall said, "Establishment of a federal rule of agency, rather than
reliance on state agency law, is particularly appropriate here given the [1976] Act's ex-
press objective of creating national uniform copyright law by broadly pre-empting
state statutory and common-law copyright regulation." Id. See 17 U.S.C. § 301(a)
(1989) (discussing pre-emption). Predictability was also important because in the
"copyright marketplace," parties can negotiate and include relevant contractual terms
with some expectation of which party will own the copyright to the work created.
Community for Creative Non-Violence, 490 U.S. at 749-50.
189. Id. at 743-47. See supra notes 44-59 and accompanying text.
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illustrates the intent of Congress to provide "two mutually exclusive
ways" for works to be considered works made for hire.190 One way is
by determining an employment relationship, and the other is by
meeting the requirements for independent contractors.191 The Court
next observed that the language of the 1976 Act indicates that "only
enumerated categories of commissioned works may be accorded work
for hire status. The hiring party's right to control the product simply
is not determinative."192 Through this declaration the Court rejected
the supervision and control test advocated by the Second193 and Sev-
enth Circuits, 194 and the formal employment definition used by the
Ninth Circuit,195 favoring instead the exclusive interpretation of the
Fifth Circuit.196 The Court's decision to rely on the existing statu-
tory language as evidence of Congressional intent gives force to the
long negotiations which were required in arriving at a provision ac-
ceptable to and satisfactory for all interested parties.
Justice Marshall rejected the supervision and control test on sev-
eral grounds. First, the language in section 101(1) focuses on the re-
lationship between the hired and hiring parties; however, this
interpretation would be distorted by the adoption of the supervision
and control test, which instead emphasizes the relationship between
the hiring party and the product.197 Second, the supervision and con-
trol test misrepresents the meaning of section 101(2). 198 The com-
mon thread among the nine specified categories of section 101(2) is
that the works are generally produced at the "instance, direction, and
risk of the publisher or producer. By their very nature, therefore,
these types of works would be works by an employee under petition-
ers' right to control the product test."' 99 This interpretation com-
190. Id. at 747.
191. Id. at 747-48.
192. Id. at 748.
193. See, e.g., Aldon Accessories Ltd. v. Spiegel, Inc., 738 F.2d 548 (2d Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 469 U.S. 982 (1984). See supra notes 94-109 and accompanying text.
194. See, e.g., Evans Newton Inc. v. Chicago Sys. Software, 793 F.2d 889 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 949 (1984). See supra notes 111-115 and accompanying text.
195. Dumas v. Gommerman, 865 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1989). See supra note 76.
196. See, e.g., Easter Seal Soc'y for Crippled Children & Adults of La. v. Playboy
Enters., 815 F.2d 323 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 981 (1988). See supra notes
76-83 and accompanying text.
197. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 490 U.S. at 741.
198, Id.
199. Id. at 741-42. "[A] party who hires a 'specially ordered or commissioned' work
by definition has a right to specify the characteristics of the product desired .... [Tihe
right to control the product test would mean that many works that could satisfy
§ 101(2) would already have been deemed works for hire under § 101(1)." Id. at 741.
pletely disregards the employee and independent contractor
dichotomy by turning any specially commissioned work into a work
made for hire whenever the hiring party has the right to control and
supervise the product.200
The Court also rejected the actual control test of Aldon.201 Under
this test, a specially ordered or commissioned work is only to be
deemed a work made for hire when the hiring party exerts actual
control over the work product.202 The Court rejected this interpreta-
tion, finding it completely devoid of statutory support.20 3 The Court
observed that nothing in the 1976 Act supports the dichotomy be-
tween "commissioned works that are actually controlled and super-
vised by the hiring party and those that are not."20 4
Furthermore, the Court held that the meaning of employee in the
1976 Act is someone in a conventional employment relationship,
rather than a formal, salaried employee.2O5 The 1976 Act does not
support the definition of employee adopted by the Ninth Circuit in
Dumas.206 Thus, the Supreme Court favored the conventional em-
ployment relationship used in agency law to define "employee." 20 7
In defining the work made for hire doctrine, the Court utilized a
two-prong test. The Court first used general common law agency
principles to determine whether the hired party should be classified
as an employee or as an independent contractor.20 8 Following this
determination, the Court applied the proper subsection of section 101:
subsection (1) for employees, and subsection (2) for independent
contractors.20 9 Use of this test by later courts will prevent trans-
forming a specially commissioned work into a work made for hire
through the right to control or supervise test, and lead to the proper
resolution of work made for hire issues in the future.210
Utilizing this two-prong test, the Court looked to agency factors
which define an employee and found them inapplicable to Reid.211
200. Id.
201. IM at 742.
202. ML
203. Ifd
204. Id. The court rejected both the Peregrine right to control and the Aldon ac-
tual control tests. Id.
205. Id. at 742 n.8.
206. Id. The Supreme Court, in refuting the formal, salaried employee test, stated
that nowhere in the Act are the words "formal" or "salaried" mentioned; the Act just
uses the word "employee." Id. For a discussion of Dumas v. Gommerman, see supra
note 84.
207. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 490 U.S. at 742 n.8.
208. Id. at 750-51. For a discussion of the Court's decision to utilize common law
agency principles, see supra notes 185-88 and accompanying text.
209. Id. at 751.
210. Id. at 750-51.
211. Id. The Court examined such factors as Reid's skill as a sculptor, CCNV's in-
ability to assign additional projects to Reid, the duration of the relationship, Reid's ab-
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However, the Court found Reid to be an independent contractor
under common law agency principles.212 Once Reid was declared an
independent contractor, the Court turned to the actual language of
the 1976 Act which dictated the application of section 101(2).213 The
sculpture Reid produced did not fall into one of the nine delineated
categories designated "works made for hire" in that section.2 14 Thus,
"Third World America" was not held to be a work made for hire.215
However, the Court did not declare Reid the sole owner of the copy-
right because the issue of joint ownership had yet to be resolved by
the district court on remand.21 6
V. IMPACT
"Despite its limited applicability, work made for hire has become a
pervasive and destructive practice in many creative fields."217 Before
the Supreme Court ruling in Community for Creative Non-Violence,
freelance artists were most affected by the uncertainty and unpre-
dictability concerning the work made for hire issue.2 18 Under any in-
terpretation, work produced by permanent employees is deemed to
be work made for hire. However, due to uneven bargaining power,
the hiring party often forces the freelance artist to sign contracts
which classify her work as work made for hire.21 9 The hiring party,
solute flexibility in determining his work schedule as long as the project was
completed by the stipulated time, Reid's discretion to hire assistants, and the fact that
Reid supplied his own tools and studio. Id. Furthermore, CCNV was not a business
and "did not pay payroll or social security taxes, provide any employee benefits, or
contribute to unemployment insurance or workers' compensation funds." I&
212. Id. at 752-53.
213. Id. at 753.
214. Id. at 738.
215. Id.
216. Id. See supra notes 167-68 and accompanying text.
217. The Artists' Bill of Rights: Hearings on S. 1253. Before the Senate Subcomm.
on Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989) (statement of
Senator Thad Cochran) [hereinafter Cochran Statement].
218. Comment, The Freelancer's Trap: Work For Hire Under The Copyright Act of
1976, 86 W. VA. L. REV. 1305, 1306 (1984). Freelance artists depend on commissions for
work since they are not formally employed by any single employer. Cochran state-
ment, supra note 217. "Freelance artists, writers, and photographers are often
presented with overreaching work made for hire contracts in situations that are con-
trary to the intent of the Copyright Act.... Very often publishers demand that work
for hire contracts be signed with no opportunity for the creator to engage in meaning-
ful negotiation." Id.
219. Id. See also Note, supra note 122, at 672, stating:
The problem is most pervasive for less known artists, who make up the bulk
of free-lancers. Because of market pressures, they are forced to sell their
works at 'bargain' prices, without the benefit of copyrights. More popular art-
who is in a more powerful position, may demand this provision be-
cause the freelance artist generally needs work and money.220 This
predicament makes it very difficult for freelance artists to survive.221
Furthermore, this inferior position encourages neither creativity nor
productivity.222 If the work increases in value beyond the expected
level, the hiring party can coerce the creator into signing an agree-
ment to relinquish copyright ownership after the creation of the
work. "The most significant difficulty is that the publisher can remu-
nerate an artist for the least valuable aspects of her work, step into
the artist's shoes as 'author' through the work-made-for-hire con-
tract, and then put the work to more valuable uses." 223 As a result,
the public will suffer from the lack of incentive offered to freelance
artists to create works of high quality.224 This affects not only tradi-
tional areas, but all areas of intellectual endeavor.
The Supreme Court in Community for Creative Non-Violence at-
tempted to ameliorate the work made for hire dilemma. It adopted a
two-prong test which dictates that the relationship between a com-
missioning party and an independent contractor does not constitute
work made for hire unless it falls under one of the nine enumerated
categories of section 101(2), and is accompanied by a written agree-
ment between the parties stipulating that the work is made for hire;
and that the relationship between employer and employee consti-
tutes work for hire under section 101(1).225 The promulgation of this
strict test provides freelance artists with the support and security of a
judicial interpretation of work made for hire. Since the Court in
Community for Creative Non-Violence returned to and strictly ap-
plied the statutory language of section 101 of the 1976 Act, the two-
prong test is not subject to liberal judicial interpretation. As such,
ists, of course, have the freedom to demand higher prices and other rights,
such as the copyright, as conditions of their [employment] contracts."
Id. at 672 n.115.
220. Id at 672.
These contracts are oppressive to free-lance artists because they usually con-
tain a clause giving the employer all future rights to the work.... This de-
prives free-lance artists of the copyright they often depend on as a part of
their livelihood. Further, if the artist refuses to sign such a contract, the em-
ployer can simply hire someone else.
Id, "The most egregious abuse ... is the increasingly common practice of stamping a
work for hire provision on the back of a check forwarded to the freelancer in payment
for producing a commissioned work." S. 1253, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135 CONG. REC.
§ 7341, § 7343 (1989).
221. Cochran Statement, supra note 217.
222. Id. The freelance artist does not have the copyright that he is entitled to as
the independent contractor; moreover, he is often categorized as an employee so that
his work may be considered made for hire but does not receive any of the benefits con-
nected with that employment. Id
223. Hamilton, supra note 43, at 1317.
224. Id. at 1311, 1317.
225. See supra notes 208-09 and accompanying text.
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the decision provides predictability to work made for hire disputes,226
and in turn empowers creators to receive their deserved copyright
protection.
Three cases alleging copyright infringement 2 27 and involving the
work made for hire provision of the 1976 Act have been decided since
Community for Creative Non-Violence: Nadel & Sons Toy Corp. v.
Shaland Corp.,228 Schiller & Schmidt, Inc. v. Wallace Computer Serv-
ices, Inc.,229 and SOS, Inc. v. Payday, Inc.230
Influenced by Community for Creative Non-Violence,231 Senator
Thad Cochran of Mississippi submitted Senate Bill 1253232 to revise
the 1976 Act provisions concerning work made for hire233 and joint
ownership.234 The Bill seeks to clarify the language of the 1976 Act
226. Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 749-50. See supra
note 218 and accompanying text.
227. To prove copyright infringement, plaintiff must show ownership of a valid
copyright and copying of the work. 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 17, at § 13.01. Ownership
of a valid copyright is dependent on a determination of whether the work is work
made for hire. 1 M. NIMMER supra note 18, at § 5.03[A].
228. No. 85 Civ. 5108 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 8, 1989) (LEXIS Genfed Library, Dist. file).
The case involved the copyright infringement of an inflatable unicorn. The facts of the
case are extremely similar to those in Aldon; see supra notes 94-109 and accompanying
text. However, in this case, the artist who drafted the model for the product was held
to be an independent contractor, and hence, the work was not made for hire. Nadel &
Sons Toy Corp., No. 85 Civ. 5108, slip op. at 23. As such, the manufacturer owned the
copyright, and no infringement occurred because the plaintiff was not the valid copy-
right owner. Id
229. No. 85 Civ. 4415 (N.D.Ill. 1989) (LEXIS Genfed Library Dist. file). The case
was brought for copyright infringement of a catalog for mail distribution. The de-
signer made similar catalogs for two competing companies simultaneously. Both the
designer and the catalog company brought cross motions for summary judgment with
regard to the issue of copyright infringement. Schiller & Schmidt, Inc. v. Wallace
Computer Services, Inc., No. 85 Civ. 4415, slip op. at 3 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 20, 1989). The
court denied the cross motions, holding that the issue of copyright infringement was a
matter best left to the trier of fact. Id. at 13.
230. 886 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1989). This case involved two employees of a computer
soft and hardware company who sold a payroll software program to a payroll and fi-
nancial services corporation without prior authorization. The computer company
brought suit for copyright infringement, misappropriation of trade secrets and account
stated. Id. at 1084. Since the parties failed to present evidence as to the nature of the
employment relationship concerning the two employees, the court did not address the
issue with regards to the work made for hire doctrine. Id. at 1087.
231. Telephone interview with Claire Ford Pickart, Legislative Aid to Senator
Cochran, in Los Angeles (March 20, 1989).
232. Senator Cochran also proposed legislative amendments in 1982 (S. 2044, 97th
Cong., 2d Sess., 128 Cong. Rec. 649 (1982)); in 1983 (S. 2138, 98th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1983)); and in 1986 (S. 2330, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., 132 CONG. REC. § 4494 (1986)). Ham-.
ilton, supra note 43, at 1307.
233. For the present definition of work made for hire, see supra note 12.
234. For the definition of joint work under the 1976 Act, see supra note 168.
to more precisely reflect the intent of Congress.235 For the first time
since 1982, when Senator Cochran submitted his first bill, Senate Bill
1253 has the support of the Copyright Office.236
Senate Bill 1253 proposes to amend both sections 101(1) and 101(2)
of the 1976 Act. As amended, section 101(1) would apply only to for-
mally salaried employees.23 7 Senator Cochran predicted that this
specification will allow for more effective adjudication, since the
agency standard evaluates some thirteen or more factors in defining
"employee."238 The agency test would be reserved for situations of
ambiguity.239 Subsequently, section 101(2) would also be amended to
require that any written agreements stipulating that the work is
"made for hire" be made before commencement of the work.240 This
amendment would protect the freelance artist from being coerced
into signing an agreement after the work is completed when it has
increased in value or as a precondition to remuneration. 241
In addition, Senator Cochran proposes to amend section 101 as it
defines joint author. The amended section would require co-authors
to make "original contributions"242 and sign a statement before the
commencement of work, expressly agreeing that the work is to be
considered a joint work.243
The introduction of the amendment to the section defining joint
authorship was prompted in part by the joint authorship issue re-
manded by the appellate court in Community for Creative Non-Vio-
lence.244 Frequently, hiring parties plead in the alternative for a
finding of joint authorship so as to circumvent an entirely adverse
235. S. 1253, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135 CONG. REC. § 7341 (1989). "My bill merely
seeks to clarify the conditions which must be present for a work for hire arrangement
to be valid. I believe these are the same conditions which Congress originally in-
tended, when it enacted the Copyright Act of 1976." 1&
236. Id.
237. Id. at § 7342. This amendment would endorse the definition of employee set
forth in Dumas v. Gommerman, 865 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1989); see supra note 84.
238. S. 1253, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135 CONG. REC. at § 7342. "Adoption of the 'for-
mal salaried' definition of 'employee' will avoid the inevitable uncertainties and costs
associated with the agency law test[,] ... which requires the evaluation of at least thir-
teen factors to the circumstances of each case, with no factor having dispositive impact
alone." I& "In sum, the 'formal, salaried' language would provide clear guidance to
the courts and to parties involved in the creation and dissemination of copyrightable
works." Id See also supra notes 76 & 206 and accompanying text.
239. Id.
240. Id. at § 7341, § 7344.
241. 1& at § 7344. "[T]he bill will have the beneficial effect of reducing the inci-
dence of disputes that arise when the value of the work brings the ownership question
to the forefront and yet no written agreement exists." Id.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 846 F.2d 1485 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
For a discussion of the joint authorship issue, see supra notes 167-68 and accompanying
text.
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judgment.245 As joint author, the hiring party becomes co-owner of
the copyright to a work.24 6 Contrastingly, under Cochran's amend-
ment, commissioning parties are denied copyright ownership in the
absence of compliance with section 101(2). The ability to plead joint
authorship in the alternative to resolution of the issue of sole copy-
right owner "is an improper solution not only because of the poten-
tial for abuse, but because it is a false solution."247 The proposal by
Senator Cochran would provide a proper method to determine who
are the true joint authors.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court holding in Community for Creative Non-Vio-
lence v. Reid has put to rest the dispute over work made for hire
which has divided the circuits for over a century. After much delib-
eration and analysis of varying circuit court approaches, the
Supreme Court adopted the exclusive interpretation of section 101's
definition of work for hire. Justice Marshall delineated a two-prong
test. First, the court should use general common law agency princi-
ples to determine if the hired party is an employee or an independent
contractor. Second, the court should apply the proper subsection of
section 101: (1) for employees, and (2) for independent contractors.
This two-prong test accurately represents the intent of Congress
when it promulgated the 1976 Act. The two-prong test is firmly
rooted in the strict reading of the statutory language of the 1976 Act;
therefore, it will lend predictability in the area of work for hire. The
two-prong test not only rewards creators for their intellectual and ar-
tistic endeavor, reinforcing the primary purpose enumerated by Con-
gress of the Copyright Clause, but also promotes uniformity of
decision and predictability for creators and hiring parties when enter-
ing into business contracts.
KATHERINE B. MARIK
245. McNamara, supra note 8, at 18.
246. "As joint authors are considered to be coowners in the work, 17 U.S.C. § 201(a)
(1982), they are treated as tenants in common. They own an undivided interest in the
whole of the work... and may independently use or license the work, subject only to
a duty to account to the other coowner for any profits earned thereby." S. 1253, 101st
Cong., 1st Sess., 135 CONG. REC. at § 7343 (citing Oddo v. Ries, 743 F.2d 630, 633 (9th
Cir. 1984)).
247. McNamara, supra note 8, at 18. "Joint authorship is a false solution to the
work made for hire controversy because assistants to the primary parties may also
qualify as joint authors." Id.

